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the whole range of p – the sign of ´µ in area D is clearly still ambigous.
Sorting this out would enable us to determine the behaviour of ´ over the
whole range of p. The properties of the income distribution which deliver
uniqueness of bp are discussed in the next section.
3 Income share elasticity and the price elas-
ticity of demand
Ideally, one would expect to pin down a unique value bp, such that ´µ > 0 for
all p < bp and ´µ < 0 for all p > bp. Given that ´µ > 0 for p 2 A and ´µ < 0
for p 2 bB, ´µ crosses zero from above at the left boundary of bB, i.e.at bp.
In order to de…ne the conditions for bp to be unique, we …rst notice that the
derivative of ´µ with respect to p is
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which, for ´µ = 0 collapses to
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where¦µ (y; µ) is the derivative with respect to µ of the income share elasticity
(Esteban, 1986). The latter is de…ned as
¦ (y; µ) = 1 +
yfy (y; µ)
f (y; µ)
and measures the percentage change of the income share accruing to individ-
uals of income y, given a marginal change in y.7 Esteban shows that there is
a one-to-one correspondence between f (y; ¢) and ¦ (y; ¢), so that any given
distribution can be characterized in terms of ¦.
Therefore, given (7),
at ´µ = 0, sign
£
´µp(p; µ)
¤
= sign [¦µ(p; µ)] (8)
This is particularly convenient, as the ¦ function typically exhibits some
useful regularity properties.
7Formally, ¦ = limh!0 1¹
R y+h
y xf (x; µ) dx, where ¹ is the mean income (Esteban 1986,
p.441).
7
We are now in the position to establish the following general proposition.
Proposition 2 If the distribution f (y; µ) and the corresponding income
share elasticity ¦ (y; µ) are such that (a) ¦µ (y; µ) is monotonically increasing
in y and crosses zero, and (b) limp!yM ´µ < 0, then there exists one value bp
such that ´µ(p; µ) > 0 for p < bp and ´µ(p; µ) < 0 for p > bp.
Proof By Proposition 1 there exists a bp which is the lowest p such that
´µ(p; µ) crosses zero, obviously from above. Condition (a) together with (8)
imply that ¦µ (ep; µ) = 0 at some unique ep > bp. This implies that bp is the
unique value of p at which ´µ is zero. To see this, notice that by condition
(b), if additional such points existed, they should be even in number. Sup-
pose they are two (the proof applies trivially for any even number), and call
them bp1 and bp2, bp1 < bp2. Obviously, ´µp will be positive at bp1 and negative atbp2. Two possibilities arise: (i) bp1 and bp2 are both lower or higher than ep; (ii)bp1 < ep < bp2. Case (i) is ruled out by (8); case (ii) is ruled out by (8) together
with condition (a). ¤
It should be noticed that conditions (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 are
veri…ed for many widely used distributions, such as those quoted in f.note 2.
One implication of Proposition 2 is that the interval bB identi…ed by
Proposition 1 is unambiguously de…ned as (bp; yB): Figure 2 brings this out
by showing a possible behaviour of the sensitivity of the elasticity of market
demand to µ; for di¤erent values of p.
—————————————–
Figure 2 about here
—————————————–
Why is it that, for prices lying between bp and yB, an increase in income
concentration generates both an increase in demand and an increase in its
elasticity (which for constant marginal costs would imply non competitive
…rms setting a lower price)? Prices in that interval are prices at which the
higher income individuals getting poorer are still able to buy, while lower
income individuals getting richer are eventually allowed to enter the market.
The additional demand accruing at these prices is therefore due to the latter
- those who descend into the middle class from the upper tail of the distri-
bution were already buyers, and keep buying after the distributional change.
However, this overall movement from the tails towards the central area of
the distribution is such that for prices belonging to bB, there are more con-
sumers actually buying, whose reservation price is close to the set price. This
implies, for example, that non competitive …rms perceive a weaker incentive
to exploit an intensive margin on higher income consumers, and a stronger
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incentive to acquire new consumers at the margin by keeping lower prices.8
Demand increases and becomes more elastic simply because there are indeed
new consumers entering the market, but also more consumers whose decision
to enter or exit the market is now very sensible to small variations in prices.
Notice that these observations are consistent with the fact that a positive
comovement of demand and demand elasticity is observed only in bB, i.e., it
is peculiar of an intermediate portion of the demand curve, as de…ned by bB.
Moreover, they apply to whatever unimodal distribution, once concentration
towards central income values is considered, and this explains the generality
of our result. As a notable example, in the next section we apply the results
of Propositions 1 and 2 to the lognormal distribution.
4 An example: income dispersion with log-
normal distribution
Assume that income is distributed lognormally. This is a particularly remark-
able case, since – as is well known – the lognormal distribution is perhaps
the model most frequently used to describe actual income frequencies.9
We standardize mean income equal to unity, so that the density and
distribution functions take the form10
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8This may o¤er a general explanation for the empirical evidence discussed by Frankel
and Gould (2001), who …nd a causal link running from income distribution in urban areas
to retail prices: according to their estimates, greater inequality is indeed associated with
an increase in retail prices paid by lower middle-class consumers.
9It is well known that the lognormal distribution …ts satisfactorily the actual income
distribution for central income values, while it is unsatisfactory in the tails, i.e. for extreme
income values (for an evaluation of the empirical performance of various distributions, see
e.g. Majumder and Chakravarty, 1990). Since the phenomenon we are interested in is
peculiar of intermediate intervals, the lognormality assumption seems worth investigating.
We recall that, if reservation prices are proportional to incomes, they also are lognormally
distributed.
10Given a generic lognormal distribution f(y; µ) = (y
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mean is ¹ = e³
p
µ. Clearly, by imposing ¹ = 1 one constrains the parameters µ and
³ according to the restriction & = ¡12 ln µ. Note, in particular, that income variance is
¾2 = µ¡ 1 > 0.
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